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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) 
(2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the sentencing court erred by failing to conduct 
an adequate inquiry into Mr. Briggs objection that the plea 
agreement had been violated by the State's recommendation for 
prison. This constitutes a question of law reviewed by the 
appellate court for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
935-36 (Utah 1994) . 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review. 
Mr. Briggs preserved this issue by way of his objection set forth 
at R. 54:7:16-21. 
2. Whether to the extent that there was no affirmative 
motion for a withdrawal of the guilty plea, appointed trial 
counsel denied Mr. Briggs of his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. To make such a showing, a 
defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient 
performance, falling below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was 
prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988). The 
1 
appellate court reviews such a claim as a matter of law. State v. 
Robertson, 2006 UT App 419, f5; State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f20, 
984 P.2d 376; State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the violation of a plea agreement by the 
State. The State's violation of the plea agreement denied Mr. 
Briggs, as the Defendant, of his constitutional right to due 
process and of his benefit of the bargain negotiated with the 
State. 
Mr. Briggs was charged with one count of Possession or Use of 
a Controlled Substance (Prior), a second-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Thereafter, Mr. 
2 
Briggs appeared before the district court pursuant to a negotiated 
plea and pleaded guilty "as charged, State will stipulate to a 
double 4 02 per statute if [D]efendant is granted & completes 
probation without any violations; otherwise silent at sentencing." 
The district court ordered that a presentence investigation report 
be prepared by Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P). 
During the initial sentencing hearing held on June 30, 2005, 
the court granted appointed trial counsel's motion for continuance 
for further investigation of a sentencing alterative. At the 
subsequent sentencing hearing on July 7, 2 005, based upon the 
conviction of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior), 
a second-degree felony, the court sentenced Mr. Briggs "to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison." Mr. Briggs, through appointed 
appellate counsel, appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Briggs was charged with one count of Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior), a second-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (R. 1-2). See 
Information, R. 1-2, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum A. 
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2. On May 26, 2005, Mr. Briggs appeared before the district 
court pursuant to a negotiated plea and pleaded guilty "as 
charged, State will stipulate to a double 402 per statute if 
[D]efendant is granted & completes probation without any 
violations; otherwise silent at sentencing." (R. 20-24). See 
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate 
of Counsel, R. 2 0-24, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum B; R. 56:2:9-16. 
3. The district court ordered that a presentence 
investigation report be prepared by Adult Probation and Parole 
(AP&P) (R. 16; R. 18; R. 56:4:21-24). 
4. At the initial sentencing hearing held on June 30, 2005, 
appointed trial counsel, surprised by AP&P's recommendation of 
prison, moved the sentencing court for a continuance to 
investigate an alternative to AP&P's recommendation of prison (R. 
55:2-3). The court granted the motion and scheduled the 
sentencing hearing for July 7, 2005 (R. 30-31) . 
5. During the subsequent sentencing hearing on July 7, 
2 0 05, appointed trial counsel argued that Mr. Briggs be given an 
opportunity to be evaluated and screened for acceptance by the Job 
Corp program to enable Mr. Briggs to develop necessary job skills 
(R. 54:2-5) . 
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6. The State then disputed Mr. Briggs' Job Corp request, 
arguing that Job Corp, as a treatment program, was inappropriate 
because Mr. Briggs is a high-risk individual who would "just 
reoffend." (R. 54:6-7) . 
7. Appointed trial counsel objected, arguing that the 
State's comments violated the plea agreement by constituting a 
"back-door recommendation for prison." (R. 54:7:16-21). 
8. Based upon the conviction of Possession or Use of a 
Controlled Substance (Prior), a second-degree felony, the district 
court, without further discussion of the plea agreement, sentenced 
Mr. Briggs "to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison" (R. 32-33) . See 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, R. 32-33, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
9. The district court signed the Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment on July 13, 2005, but, according to the docket, it was 
entered on July 7, 2005 (R. 32-33). 
10. Mr. Briggs, through appointed appellate counsel, filed 
a timely Notice of Appeal on August 5, 2005 (R. 37-40) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The sentencing court erred by failing to conduct an 
adequate inquiry into Mr. Briggs objection that the plea agreement 
5 
had been violated by the State's recommendation for prison. The 
record on appeal demonstrates that the State unilaterally violated 
the plea agreement by not remaining silent at sentencing and 
instead substantially and affirmatively making a recommendation 
for prison. In light of the United State's Supreme Court's 
holding in Santobello and the subsequent Utah case law addressing 
Mr. Briggs' entitlement that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea, the sentencing court erred by failing to conduct an adequate 
inquiry concerning the State's alleged violation of the plea 
agreement. 
2. To the extent that there was no affirmative motion for 
a withdrawal of the guilty plea, appointed trial counsel denied 
Mr. Briggs of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. But for counsel's unprofessional error of 
failing to affirmatively request that the sentencing court 
withdraw or set aside the guilty plea, the result at sentencing 
would have been different. Had the sentencing court been so moved 
upon, it more likely than not would have duly and more carefully 
considered the State's violation of the plea agreement, which, in 
turn, would have demonstrated Mr. Briggs' entitlement to have the 
guilty plea withdrawn. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE SENTENCING COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 
CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY INTO MR, BRIGGS 
OBJECTION THAT THE PLEA AGREEMENT HAD BEEN 
VIOLATED BY THE STATE'S RECOMMENDATION FOR 
PRISON. 
" [A] constant factor is that when a plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so 
that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, 
such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499 (1971). "It is well established that 
a prosecutor may not make promises which induce a guilty plea and 
then refuse to keep those promises." State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266, 1275 (Utah 1988) . 
In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 92 S.Ct. 
495, 498-99 (1971), the United States Supreme Court "expressly 
recognized that, as a matter of due process, a defendant who 
pleads guilty has a constitutional right to a remedy when that 
agreement is broken." State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 12 94, 13 06 (Utah 
1986) . The prosecutor, in Santobello, promised not to make any 
recommendations concerning the defendant's sentence in return for 
the defendant's guilty plea to a lesser offense than with which he 
had been charged. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 258, 92 S.Ct. at 497. 
The prosecutor failed to keep that promise. Even though the 
prosecutor's recommendation of a maximum one-year sentence did not 
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influence the sentencing judge, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the case for either a withdrawal of the plea 
or specific enforcement of the agreement on the plea. Id. at 262-
63, 92 S.Ct. at 499. 
Utah law follows the Santobello precedent. In State v. 
Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976), the prosecutor promised to 
recommend probation for the defendant to the sentencing judge. 
Id. at 130. On appeal, the defendant argued that the State 
violated the plea bargain agreement because it had not fulfilled 
its promise to recommend probation. Id. at 129. The Utah Supreme 
Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether the recommendation had been included in the probation 
report. Id. at 131. More pointedly, the court held that if the 
recommendation had not been included, the defendant was "entitled 
to have his sentence set aside and to be resentenced with the 
benefit of his bargain." Id. at 130. 
In State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
Court, in the course of examining the possible double jeopardy 
implications of a broken plea agreement, stated: 
If the . . . prosecutor refused to comply 
with the terms of the plea [after it is 
entered and accepted], the defendant may 
choose to withdraw the plea . . . . [0]nce 
the court or prosecution has entered into a 
plea agreement and that plea has been 
accepted and entered, neither one may 
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unilaterally withdraw from the agreement 
without a showing that facts analogous to 
those warranting a mistrial exist (at least 
in the absence of a breach of the agreement 
by the defendant). 
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1276 (quoting Kay, 111 P.2d at 1304) 
(alterations included). 
In the instant case, Mr. Briggs appeared before the district 
court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and pleaded guilty 
"as charged, State will stipulate to a double 402 per statute if 
[D]efendant is granted & completes probation without any 
violations; otherwise [the State will remain] silent at 
sentencing." (R. 2 0-24). See Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel, R. 20-24, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B.; see also 
R. 56:2:9-16. The court then ordered that a presentence 
investigation report be prepared by AP&P. 
At the initial sentencing hearing, appointed trial counsel, 
who was surprised by AP&P's recommendation of prison, moved the 
sentencing court for a continuance to investigate an alternative 
to recommendation of prison. The court granted the motion and 
scheduled the sentencing for a week later. 
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, appointed trial counsel 
enthusiastically argued that the court provide Mr. Briggs with the 
opportunity to be evaluated and screened for acceptance by the Job 
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Corp program to enable Mr. Briggs to develop necessary job skills. 
In response, the State disputed Mr. Briggs' Job Corp request, 
arguing that Job Corp, as a treatment program, was inappropriate 
because Mr. Briggs is a high-risk individual who would "just 
reoffend." 
Appointed trial counsel objected, arguing that the State's 
comments violated the plea agreement by constituting a "back-door 
recommendation for prison." Without further discussion regarding 
the plea agreement violation, the sentencing judge sentenced Mr. 
Briggs to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more 
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The record on appeal demonstrates that the State unilaterally 
violated the plea agreement by not remaining silent at sentencing 
and instead substantially making a recommendation for prison. In 
light of Santobello and the subsequent case law addressing Mr. 
Briggs' entitlement that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea, the sentencing court erred by failing to conduct an adequate 
inquiry concerning the State's alleged violation of the plea 
agreement. 
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II. TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE WAS NO AFFIRMATIVE 
MOTION FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF THE GUILTY PLEA# 
APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. BRIGGS OF 
HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test 
for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment1 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2 064. This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a 
defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, 893 
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). " [T] he right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair 
sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 
838, 842, (1993). 
xThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that Mi]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
"'identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
'show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness."' State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). A defendant must ''overcome 
the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 
U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. UA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah 
1994); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Appointed trial counsel, in the instant case, objected to the 
State's failure to remain silent and its recommendation made at 
sentencing. However, to the extent that appointed trial counsel 
failed to follow-up the objection with an affirmative motion to 
12 
withdraw or set aside the guilty plea, he arguably waived the 
right of Mr. Briggs to have the sentencing court duly consider 
such a motion. Appointed trial counsel's failure fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. This is 
demonstrated by existing Utah case law, as previously discussed, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6,2 and the underlying factual 
circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to 
affirmatively request that the sentencing court withdraw or set 
aside the guilty plea, the result at sentencing would have been 
different. Had the sentencing court been so moved upon, it more 
likely than not would have duly and more carefully considered the 
State's violation of the plea agreement, which, in turn, would 
have demonstrated Mr. Briggs' entitlement to have the guilty plea 
withdrawn. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Briggs respectfully requests that 
this Court vacate the sentence and remand the case to the trial 
court for a determination of whether Mr. Briggs desires to have 
2Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 provides, in relevant part, that " [a] 
request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made by motion 
before sentence is announced . . . ." 
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the guilty plea withdrawn and for further proceedings consistent 
with this Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (Q day of January, 2006. 
ARNC)tB\& WIGGINS, P.C, 
Scott L) Wig-
leys pellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following on this (p day of 
January, 2 006: 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 14 085^ 
Salt Lake/5ity,"^T\ 84\14-0854 
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Tab A 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
P. O. Box 618 
800 West State Street 
FarmingtonUT 84025 
Telephone: (801)451-4300 
Fax: (801)451-4328 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS 
DOB: 09/20/1982, 
Defendant. 
Bail: 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 
OTN17058850 TC-Y 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, 
either directly or as a party, on or about April 19, 2005 at County of Davis, State of Utah, 
committed the crime of: 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (PRIOR), (581) 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) UCA, second degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the 
defendant, having been previously convicted of Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled 
Substance, did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance, to wit: 
Methamphetamine. 
This Information is based on evidence obtained from witness Patrick Swain. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy 
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Patrick 
Swain of the Layton Police Department, and the information herein is based upon such personal 
observations and investigation of said officer. 
SECOND DIS1WC1 L'GURl 
2085 APR 20 A l t * t < 3 
On April 19, 2005 the defendant was searched incident to an arrest on a warrant. 
Upon searching the defendant, the police officer found a baggie containing a substance that 
^ tested positive for methamphetamine. The defendant has been twice before convicted of 
A3 
* possession of a controlled substance. 
Authorized April 20, 2005 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN<fWILSON 
Davis bounty Attorn 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
TabB 
MAY 2? 2005 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDlfclAL D i s i ^ ^ / o " 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STAm43EK§ffl!CTCOURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 6*^0006^ 
I, BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and 
that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s): 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
Degree Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
sfi^i~8U\&V,i 
P&CP" Y 
B 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to 
me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are: :
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) listed 
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons 
for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty plea and 
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guiltv-
i and < 
On April 19, 2005 the defendant was searched incident to an arrest on a warrant. Upon searching 
the defendant, the police officer found a baggie containing a substance that tested positive for 
methamphetamine. The defendant has been twice before convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering this plea voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up all the 
following rights: 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford 
one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might later, if the 
judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) ^are^waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. I also 
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea. 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is J&z///* ^ 7 ^ / V - y g ^ -
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilty plea. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury 
and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, 
(a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and (b) my attorney, 
or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the 
witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I 
chose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear., the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one 
could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if I chose not to testify, 
the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I am 
presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the 
charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State 
would have the burden of proving each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
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I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting 
that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State 
would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I 
plead guilty. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and 
constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which 
I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a 
prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime(s), including 
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime involved, 
the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time 
(concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also 
know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on 
parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states 
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting 
attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this 
statement, including those explained below: 
<2- p ^ ^ 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any 
opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
3 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful influence 
of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this 
statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. ' f#uS 
I amcs^p2v Years of age- I have attended school through the \5Li7 grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me. 
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment 
when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding 
these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, defect, or 
impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must move to withdraw my plea before 
my sentence is announced. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show it was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made. 
Dated this 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS, the defendant above, and that I 
know defendant has read the statement or that I have read it to defendant; I have discussed it with 
defendant and believe that defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; 
and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
affidavit, are accurate and true. 
4*-
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against BRANDON JAMES 
BRIGGS, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations 
are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record 
before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of 
defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea is entered and that the acceptance of the plea would serve 
the public interest. 
PROSECUTION ATTORNEY 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and 
counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that 
the defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the crime(s) set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. ^ 
Dated this J ^ ^ d a y of /pVJ&t- , 20b-t? 
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2nd District - Farmington COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRANDON JAMES BRIGGS, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Bail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: glendap 
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): UTZINGER, TODD A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 20, 1982 
Video 
Tape Number: 7/7/05 Tape Count: 10.04 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/26/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
The defendant to pay a $500 Public Defender Fee. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the DAVIS County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051700620 FS 
Judge: DARWIN C. HANSEN 
Date: Julv 7, 2005 
Case No: 051700620 
Date: Jul 07, 2005 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
/£ Dated this / ^ day of 
District Court Judge 
